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In 1988, in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,1 (Basic), the United States Supreme
Court adopted the fraud on the market theory in order to create a pre-
sumption of reliance in a Security & Exchange Commissions Rule 10(b)
securities fraud case. As a result, it will be significantly easier to certify
a class in order for a plaintiff to bring a class action for securities fraud.
However, while simplifying the initial class certification, the fraud on the
market theory injects economic theory and studies into the determination
of securities fraud.
This article first explains the economic and legal background behind
the fraud on the market presumption. Then, the landmark case of Basic
is examined for guidance in applying the presumption and proving de-
fenses to that presumption. Lastly, it is shown how economic analysis
can be used in proving or disproving fraud on the market, including an
empirical study of the events in Basic. The Court's decision in Basic
invites the use of economic/financial analysis, without recognition or guid-
ance concerning that use. This article illustrates the importance of fi-
nancial analysis in pursuing and defending a securities fraud case based
on the fraud on the market presumption.
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE ECONOMIC BASIS FOR FRAUD ON THE MARKET
The United States Congress adopted the Securities Exchange Act in
1934, and specifically section 10(b),2 in order to prevent fraudulent and
deceptive acts in the buying and selling of securities, and to encourage
Associate Professor of Business Law, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University, Blacksburg, Virginia.
**
Associate Professor of Finance, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Uni-
versity, Blacksburg, Virginia.
1 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
Sec. 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b)(1982). See also Rule 10(b)(5) enacted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) under this provision 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981).
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the free flow of information to the market about those securities. 3 The
SEC enforces those provisions, and a private cause of action has been
recognized for civil damages as well.4
The elements of the common law tort of deceit are used as the basis
for the individual action for damages under 10(b). 5 To prove deceit, a
plaintiff must show that a defendant made a knowing, or reckless, false
statement intending to induce reliance by the plaintiff, upon which the
plaintiff justifiably relied, thereby suffering damages.6 As applied to the
exchange of securities, the individual reliance requirement has been crit-
icized as being too restrictive in an era when most sales and purchases
are made in an impersonal market. Direct reliance on a misstatement
may be difficult to prove, therefore preventing recovery by a class of
plaintiffs dealing in an indirect market.
The fraud on the market theory allows recovery for "indirect" reliance
on the market rather than direct reliance on a misstatement or omission
by relying on the financial hypothesis of an efficient market.7 Courts are
willing to accept the individual's reliance on the market because of the
economic/financial hypothesis of an efficient market. The theory is that
the "stock market operates efficiently when professional investors com-
pete to predict future market values of individual securities."8 This is
because these professionals are trained to evaluate, and have the re-
sources to evaluate, market information. Therefore, if the analysts have
control of sufficient capital, the market will reflect the true, intrinsic
value of the stock.9 An investor need not make individual inquiries to
obtain market information, but instead can rely on the price of the se-
curity in the market as a true reflection of its value. 1° Since the fraud on
the market theory is premised on the economic hypothesis of an efficient
market, it is necessary to consider that theory in more detail.
Financial theory and rigorous statistical testing of market efficiency
began in the 1960's. When financial economists refer to market efficiency
they are addressing the ability of market prices to correctly reflect avail-
3 See H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934).
4 See Superintendent of Ins. v. Banker's Life and Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13
n. 9 (1971); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975)(private cause of action recognized when suit brought by an actual purchaser of
a security).
I See Note, Fraud on the Market: An Emerging Theory of Recovery Under SEC
Rule 10b-5, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 627, 632 (1982).
aSee L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 105 (5th Ed. 1984).
See Note, The Fraud on the Market Theory Efficient Markets and the Defenses
to an Implied 10b-5 Action, 70 IowA L. REV. 975, 979 (1985).
8 1Id.
I This is also known as the market model of investment decision making. Id.
at 982.
10 In fact, individual investigation under this hypothesis would be economically
inefficient. Id. at 983. An important corollary of this theory is that information
is quickly translated into the marketplace. Id. at 979.
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able information. This is important to investors because they can more
appropriately allocate their resources when a security's price accurately
reflects all economically relevant information.1
Market efficiency is not determined by a bright line test, but is con-
sidered a matter of degree. There are three theoretical degrees of market
efficiency." The first degree is known as the weak-form of market effi-
ciency. This theory hypothesizes that present market prices will reflect
past price or volume dependencies or trends. The second degree of market
efficiency is termed semi-strong, which would occur when all "obviously
publicly available" information is reflected in the security's price. This
information includes annual and quarterly reports, press releases, and
certain macroeconomic statistics and balance sheet transformations such
as debt issue, capital investments or stock splits. There has been extensive
empirical financial testing of the semi-strong form of market efficiency,
with almost unanimous agreement on its applicability to established mar-
kets.13 The last degree of possible market efficiency is called strong form
efficiency. This form hypothesizes that the market reflects non-public
restricted information. Empirical studies, however, fail to provide support
for this type of efficiency.14
Most financial studies have evaluated the New York Stock Exchange
and to a lesser degree, the American Stock Exchange. The semi-strong
theory of efficiency may be less applicable to firms whose stock is thinly
traded. The lower the volume of trading, the less likely it is that certain
information will be assimilated into the market. If information is passed
through the market, assimilation will be at a slower rate than heavily
traded stock, which may respond to information as quickly as one day.15
Regional exchanges are generally untested for efficiency. They may not
qualify under the semi-strong theory, because they are characterized by
many small companies and speculative stocks.
In summary, market efficiency is viewed as a continuum by economists.
The weak and semi-strong theories are widely accepted as applicable to
the New York Stock Exchange, and perhaps the American Stock Ex-
change. But, the semi-strong theory is probably inapplicable to smaller,
regional exchanges. The strong form of efficiency is not supported by
financial studies.
11 When markets are informationally efficient, they also become more alloca-
tionally efficient. For an excellent discussion of market efficiency and the efficient
capital market hypothesis, see Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis,
Economic Theory and the Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REV.
1031 (1977).
12 For a comprehensive review of the literature, see Fama, Efficient Capital
Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Works, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970). See
also, T. COPELAND and J. WESTON, FINANCIAL THEORY AND CORPORATE POLICY
285-311 (1983).
13 Fama, supra note 12.
14 Id.
15 Virtually every study finds significant market response on the day the in-
formation is released or the event occurs. Typically, market adjustments on fol-
lowing days are relatively minor. Id.
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The application of the efficient market theory to securities fraud and
manipulation affects the element of reliance. Theoretically, it is not nec-
essary for the individual investor to read and ingest market information
because the current market price reflects an assimilation of any public
information available about a stock. Therefore, there should be no re-
quirement for subjective reliance in a fraud case. The individual who
trades based on the assumption of the efficient market will be injured
when misstatements are made, because the market will not reflect the
intrinsic value of the stock. Reliance on the high integrity of the market
replaces reliance on a particular misstatement or omission.16 Courts have
called this reliance on the high integrity of the market, instead of sub-
jective reliance on misstatements or omissions, the fraud on the market
theory.
II. JUDICIAL BACKGROUND OF FRAUD ON THE MARKET
The fraud on the market theory had been discussed in the circuit courts
with favor, if not consistency, before the United States Supreme Court
addressed the issue in Basic. Actually the Supreme Court case of Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States" is seen as a precursor of, and encouragement
for, circuit court adoption of the fraud on the market theory. In this case,
bank employees encouraged Ute Indians to sell to non-Indians, stock of
a corporation which handled tribal assets. They did not inform the Indians
of facts which may have discouraged the sales.18 The Supreme Court held
that the bank had an affirmative duty to disclose the material facts, and
that in a case "involving primarily a failure to disclose, positive proof of
reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery.19 Thus, the first step was taken
to lighten the burden of proving direct reliance on the alleged misstate-
ment in a 10(b) action.
The first circuit court to recognize the fraud on the market theory, and
establish a rebuttable presumption of reliance on market integrity, was
Blackie v. Barrack,20 a Ninth Circuit Case decided in 1975. The plaintiffs
16 See Grzebielski, Should the Supreme Court Recognize General Market Re-
liance in Private Actions Under Rule lOb-5?, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 335, 342 (1984).
This article also contains an excellent discussion of the efficient market theory.
Id at 342-49.
17 Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
I Id. at 153.
19 Id. For a discussion of reactions to this case, see Black, Fraud on the Market:
A Criticism of Dispensing With Reliance Requirements in Certain Open Market
Transactions, 62 N.C.L. REv. 435, 444-45 (1984).
20 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
The major Circuit Court cases are discussed in this article. For further cases
that have adopted the fraud on the market theory, see Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti
Corp., 817 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988); Teamsters
Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, 762 F.2d 522 (1985), affld, 839 F. 2d
366 (7th Cir. 1988) (fraudulently induced loan); In re Union Carbide Corp. Con-
[Vol. 38:4
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brought a class action lawsuit alleging that misrepresentations and mis-
calculations were made in a company's annual report and other docu-
ments which inflated the price of its stock. The class consisted of those
who bought the stock during the 27-month period of alleged misrepre-
sentations. Since the plaintiffs had to establish reliance as an element of
a 10(b)-5 action, defendants argued that proof of individualized reliance
defeated the element of commonality needed to certify the class.
21
The Ninth Circuit noted that the reason for requiring reliance is in
order to prove causation between the wrong and the injury. Because of
the "impersonal stock exchange context"22 the court accepted proof of
causation by a showing of a qualifying purchase and a material misre-
presentation. The court noted that, "materiality circumstantially estab-
lishes the reliance of some market traders and hence the inflation in the
stock price - when the purchase is made the causational chain between
defendant's conduct and plaintiffs loss is sufficiently established to make
out a prima facie case. '2 The court rejected defendant's argument that
this reasoning removed the "compensatory '24 nature of the action; in other
sumer Prods. Business, 676 F. Supp. 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (accepted only on open,
developed market; In re Apple Sec. Litig., 672 F. Supp. 1552 (N.D.Cal. 1987),
modified, 886 F. 2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3229 (1990)(harm
occurs without knowledge of misrepresentation because of fraud on the market);
Sheftelman v. Jones, 667 F. Supp. 859 (N.D.Ga. 1987) (allows class certification);
Nelson v. Craig-Hallum, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 480 (D.Minn. 1987) (allows class
certification); Shapiro v. Merill-Lynch, 634 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.Ohio 1987) (accepted
in open market transaction); Abelson v. Strong, 644 F. Supp. 524 (D.Mass. 1986)
In re Storage Technology Corp. Sec Litig., 630 F. Supp. 1072 (D.Colo. 1986) (open
market transaction); Rosenberg v. Digilog, 648 F. Supp. 40 (E.D.Pa. 1985); Gross-
man v. Waste Management, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 395 (N.D.Ill. 1984); Klein v. Com-
puter Devices, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re McDonnell Douglas
Corp. Sec. Litig., 587 F. Supp. 625 (E.D Mo. 1983) (plaintiff relied on integrity of
market); Sanders v. Thrall Car Mfg. Co., 582 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Rose
v. Arkansas Valley Envtl. & Util. Auth., 562 F. Supp. 1180 (W.D.Mo. 1983);
Zuckerman v. Franz, 573 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.Fla. 1983); Weckesser v. Westerling,
531 F. Supp. 276 (S.D.Ohio 1981) (scheme asserted); Mottoros v. Abrams, 524 F.
Supp. 254 (N.D.I1l. 1981); In re Texas Int'l. Sec. Litig., 114 F.R.D. 33 (W.D. Okl.
1987) (open market); In re Consumers Power Co. Sec. Litig., 105 F.R.D. 583 (1985).
For cases where fraud on the market has not been applied, see Zlotnick v. TIE
Communications, 665 F. Supp. 397 (E.D.Pa. 1987) (fraud on market inapplicable
because plaintiff did not believe misrepresentations); Platsis v. E. F. Hutton and
Co., Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1277 (W.D.Mich. 1986), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 962 (1988)(fraud on market inappropriate when plaintiff bought directly from issuer); Rein-
gold v. Deloitte, Haskins and Sells, 599 F. Supp. 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (not applied
because market inefficient); Lucas v. Florida Power and Light Co., 575 F. Supp.
552 (S.D.Fla. 1983) (fraud on market inapplicable because plaintiff didn't read
misleading documents); Fausett v. American Resource Management Corp., 542
F. Supp. 1234 (D.Utah 1982) (fraud on market rebutted since plaintiff already
committed to sell); Gibb v. Delta Drilling Co., 104 F.R.D. 59 (N.D. Tex. 1984)
(need scheme to defraud when fraud on market applied to new securities).
21 Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F. 2d 904, 906 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
816 (1976).
22 Id. at 906.
23 Id.
24 Id.
19901
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words, that it transformed it into a strict liability basis of recovery. In-
stead, the court explained, the plaintiff obtained the benefit of an infer-
ence of reliance (based on proof of materiality) which shifted to the
defendant "the burden of disproving a prima facie case of causation.
2
5
The defendant would successfully defeat the inference of reliance by show-
ing either that the statement was immaterial, the market did not act
upon the statements, or the plaintiff knew the statement was false or
would have purchased anyway had he known the statement was false.
This result, the court said, was consistent with the goal of the securities
statutes by protecting impersonal market participants who should be able
to rely on a fraud-free market.
2 6
The next case to expand upon the standard set forth in Blackie was
Panzirer v. Wolf,27 in the Second Circuit. The plaintiff purchased stock in
a company because of a favorable article in the Wall Street Journal and
because her broker found no negative comments about the company. Be-
cause of accounting discrepancies (omissions) in financial reports, plaintiff
alleged the price of the stock was artificially high, supported by the fact
that less than a year later the company declared bankruptcy. The plaintiff
alleged that she had ielied upon the integrity of the market as a whole
when purchasing the stock, even though she had evidently not relied
upon the stock price itself. In addition the court expanded the circum-
stantial proof of reliance on the market rationale in Blackie, by allowing
the plaintiff to recover because of her reliance on information dissemi-
nated by third parties, because those third parties relied upon the mar-
ket.28 This reliance upon those who relied theory seems to create a
standard which cannot be rebutted.2 9 Indeed, the court did not identify
any method of refuting the presumption.
Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.30 involved an alleged manipulation
of stock through proxy solicitations in order to effect a merger. Thus, both
10(b) and 14(a) were in issue.31 The Second Circuit held that "proof of
transaction causation is unnecessary by virtue of the allegations as to
the effectuation of a scheme to defraud which includes market manipu-
lation.' ' 32 The court distinguished between loss causation, which it
equated with economic loss, and transaction causation, which it related
to reliance. The court cited Affiliated Ute for the proposition that trans-
25 Id.
26 Id. at 907.
27 Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 1027
(1982). See generally, Grzebielski, supra note 16; Note, Panzirer v. Wolf- An Ex-
tension of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory of Liability Under SEC Rule lOb-5,
32 CATH.U.L.REv. 695 (1983).
18 Panzirer, 663 F. 2d at 367.
19 Black, supra note 19, at 452.
10 Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 976 (1975).
31 This paper only discusses the 10(b) cause of action.
32 Schlick, 507 F.2d at 381.
[Vol. 38:4
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action causation is presumed when there is an omission.3 3 It seemed to
extend Affiliated Ute by holding that proof of transaction causation is
also unnecessary upon a showing that the market was manipulated. In-
stead, all that is necessary is proof of economic loss, or loss causation. No
exceptions were noted to the presumption of transaction causation.
The Fifth Circuit addressed the fraud on the market controversy in
Shores v. Sklar I,34 decided in 1981. The plaintiff purchased newly issued
bonds that depreciated rapidly. Two allegations were brought; that spe-
cific misrepresentations were made in the offering circular and that the
issuer conspired to sell unmarketable securities. The plaintiff did not
read the circular before his purchase, and defendants argued that this
should preclude recovery because of a lack of reliance. The court distin-
guished sections 10b-5(1) and (3) from 10b-5(2). They interpreted section
(2), the prohibition of misleading material misrepresentations or omis-
sions, to require reliance. In contrast, sections (1) and (3), the sections
prohibiting fraudulent actions, practices or schemes, were distinguished.
Under (1) and (3) no direct reliance need be proven since the "requisite
element of causation in fact would be established if Bishop [the plaintiff]
proved the scheme was intended to and did bring the bonds onto the
market fraudulently and proved he relied on the integrity of the offerings
of the securities market.'35 The court argued that this judicial holding
supported the underlying broad purpose of the securities laws to protect
investors from fraud. It dismissed the argument that incentives for full
disclosure would be defeated by allowing one who did not read disclosure
material to recover, because this case involved securities that were un-
marketable, absent the fraud.36
In 1983, the Tenth Circuit faced the fraud on the market hypothesis
in T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Irrigation Fuel Authority.37 Again, this case
involved the selling of bonds which the plaintiff alleged were not lawfully
issued. Once issued, it was argued that the proceeds were illegally di-
verted.38 The court noted the difference between applying the fraud on
3 Id.
- Shores v. Sklar I, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1102 (1983). This case is noted as "I" because after the court reversed and
remanded it to the district court, class certification was still denied. A second
appeal is found at Shores v. Sklar I1, 844 F.2d 1485 (11th Cir. 1988).
31 Shores v. Sklar I, 647 F. 2d at 469.
36 Id. at 470-71.
For other cases addressing the unmarketability of securities see Ross v. Bank
South, N.A., 837 F.2d 980 (11th Cir. 1988) (scheme to issue unmarketable tax
exempt bonds); Kirkpatrick v. J. C. Bradford and Co., 827 F.2d 718 (11th Cir.
1987) (not an open market, but unmarketable absent defendant's fraud); Gold-
water v. Bird, 664 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.Ill. 1986) (newly issued bonds must be
unmarketable absent fraud); In re N.Y. City Mun. Sec. Litig., 87 F.R.D. 572 (1980)
(materiality of nondisclosure proves causation).
17 T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Irrigation Fuel Authority, 717 F.2d 1330 (10th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984).
38Id. at 1331.
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the market theory to well-developed and actively traded securities versus
bond sales on a lesser market. However, they chose to follow Shores I and
held that the plaintiff stated a valid claim by alleging that he "relied on
the availability of the bonds as indicating their lawful issuance. '39 By so
doing, the Court expressed their intent to give broad effect to the secu-
rities laws in order to protect investors.
The Eleventh Circuit also decided a fraud on the market case, in 1984,
in Lipton v. Documation, Inc.40 The plaintiffs alleged that because of false
financial information intentionally disseminated into the market, that
the price of Documation Securities was artificially high. Plaintiffs did not
rely on the erroneous statements, but did rely on the market to reflect
the true value of the securities. The court reaffirmed reliance as an ele-
ment in a 10b-5 action because it proves causation and ensures "that the
federal securities laws do not expose defendants to limitless liability or
become transformed into merely private enforcement mechanisms.
'4 1 It
distinguished Shores I because it did not deal with an open market trans-
action.42 The court adopted the position in Blackie that reliance is a re-
quired element in lOb-5, but may be presumed in an open market. The
presumption could be rebutted by showing that the plaintiff would have
purchased anyway, or that the misrepresentations were immaterial.43
Fraudulently marketed bonds were the disputed security in Harris v.
Union Electric Co." in 1986. The plaintiffs alleged that the prospectus
inaccurately described the call features of the bonds. If the features had
been truthfully known, the plaintiff would not have purchased the bonds,
so the court treated this case as one of omission rather than strict mis-
representation. Based on that reasoning, then reliance upon material
omissions was presumed, without proof of direct reliance, following the
precedent of Affiliated Ute.45
Lastly in 1986 the Third Circuit, in Peil v. Speiser, 4 distinguished the
reasoning in Shores I as to the different application of reliance to 10b-
5(a) and (c) versus 10b-5(b). 47 The court assumed that the Shores Idecision
19 Id. at 1333.
- Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1132 (1985).
41 Id. at 742.
42 Id. at 745 (the court gives a very good analysis of the reasoning in Shores
v. Sklar I).
Lipton, 734 F.2d at 748.
Harris v. Union Electric Co., 787 F.2d 355 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 107 S. Ct.
94 (1986).
4 Id. at 365. Fortunately, this reasoning is unique to Harris. Otherwise, any
misrepresentation would also include an omission, of the truth.
46 Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154 (3d Cir. 1986).
17 The courts are still divided on this issue of newly issued securities. Even
within the same state, courts have come to opposite conclusions. Compare Jackson
v. First Fed. Sav. of Arkansas, F.A., 709 F. Supp. 863, 876 (E.D. Ark. 1988)
(following distinction in Shores 1) with Dingler v. T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc., 708 F.
Supp. 1044, 1049 (W.D.Ark. 1989) (Shores is unsound). See also Lubin v. Sybedon
Corp., 688 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D.Cal. 1988) (factually distinguishes Shores 1).
[Vol. 38:4
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was limited to a case involving newly issued securities. Because there
was no market to respond to a single misrepresentation under 10b-5(b),
reliance on such a nonexistent market could not be presumed. The prev-
alence of a scheme under 10b(a) and (c) could effect the entire market-
ability of a security, however, and thus reliance on that marketability
could be presumed. The Peil court's interpretation of Shores I was im-
material to its own fact situation because it was deciding a case involving
a developed market. Thus, it held the distinction between 10b-5 (a) and
(c) and 10b-5(b) to be inapplicable, "because a well-developed market can
reasonably be presumed to respond to even a single misrepresentation or
omission concerning a stock already being traded in that market." The
court applied the fraud on the market theory, which allowed recovery
despite the non-reliance on the defendant's statements, because of pre-
sumed reliance on the marketplace. The reliance could be refuted by
showing that the alleged actions did not affect the price of the stock or
that the plaintiff would have purchased the stock regardless of the mis-
representations.
49
The cases before Basic can be analyzed based upon several categories.
First, the cases agreed in their interpretation and application of Affiliated
Ute. If the facts involve an omission or nondisclosure, then reliance will
be presumed because of the difficulty of proving a prospective action.
Harris is the only case which extends this logic to interpret the misstate-
ment of a fact as the omission of the truth about a fact. This interpretation
would effectively negate the distinction between omission and misrepre-
sentation, since every misrepresentation is an omission of the truth. This
logic is fortunately singular to the Harris case, and thus can be dis-
counted. Thus, the omission cases are clearly handled by an extension of
Affiliated Ute.
The misrepresentation cases, however, must be further separated into
ones involving an open market and those involving trades on less public
and less open markets. The open market cases are characterized by the
cases of Blackie, Panzirer, Schlick, Lipton and Peil. All of these cases
utilize a presumption of plaintiff's reliance on the integrity of an estab-
lished market to reflect the true value of a security. In Panzirer, the
reliance on the market is attenuated because the plaintiff relied indirectly
on the market, through reports in the media. Panzirer and Schlick also
seem to create presumptions which are irrebuttable, since they do not
identify any circumstances which would overcome the presumption of
reliance. In comparison, Blackie listed four ways the defendant could
overcome the presumption of reliance, by proving that; 1) the presumption
was immaterial, 2) the market did not react to the statements, 3) the
plaintiff knew the statement was false, or 4) the plaintiff would have
acted anyway, despite the false statements.50 Lipton only recognized the
48 Peil v. Speiser, 806 F. 2d 1154, 1163 (3d Cir. 1986).
49 d.
10 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. Compare the analysis in Black,
supra note 19 at 447-50.
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immaterially of the statements and the plaintiff who would act despite
the false statements as methods to rebut the presumption. Peil identified
two defenses to the presumption of reliance, that the plaintiff would have
acted anyway or that the price of the stock was unaffected by the mis-
representations. The open market cases, then, agree on the creation of a
presumption of reliance on the integrity of the market, but disagree about
the rebuttability of that presumption.
Shores I and Raney are the cases dealing with undeveloped markets,
both involving the sale of new bonds. Raney basically adopts the rationale
of Shores I, while specifically noting the inapplicability of the broad fraud
on the market theory to less developed markets." It implies that the key
to applying the fraud on the market theory is that the securities be
actively traded on a market which reacts to and internalizes information.
In the absence of a well developed market, Shores I requires that there
be a pervasive scheme to manipulate securities (in these cases, to market
unmarketable bonds), in order to dispense with direct reliance on the
defendant's actions. In essence, when an underdeveloped market is in-
volved, reliance on the market cannot be presumed because it is not
warranted. However, an investor's reliance on the basic marketability of
a security can be presumed, and it is a violation of 10(b)(2) if a deceptive
scheme puts unmarketable securities on the market. 52
As the Supreme Court of the United States agreed to hear the appeal
of Basic, the circuit courts were divided on key issues involved in the
fraud on the market theory. They each embraced the fraud on the market
theory to some extent, but applied different presumptions and allowed
defendants differing, if any, defenses.
III. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson
Basic, Inc. (Basic) was a company with publicly traded stock that man-
ufactured goods used by the steel industry. It was the target of a merger
by Combustion Engineering Co. (Combustion) as early as the mid-1960's,
but negotiations between the two began in earnest in 1976. In 1977 and
1978 Basic stock was heavily traded, and increased in value. Basic officers,
and the company, issued three statements during those two years denying
any negotiations and disclaiming any knowledge of reasons for the stock's
activity. On December 18, 1978, Basic asked for a suspension of trading
of its stock, and on December 19, 1978, the board of directors of Basic
approved Combustion's offer for all of its outstanding shares.5 3
51 T. J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Irrigation Fuel Authority, 717 F.2d at 1332. See
also, Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95 HARv.L.REv. 1143, 1153-58(1982)
(argues the theory should only apply to well developed markets).
52 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
- Basic. Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 226-28 (1988).
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Plaintiff shareholders brought a class action against Basic and its di-
rectors under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. They claimed injury because
the three false or misleading public denials depressed the price of the
stock. The class consisted of those who sold Basic stock between the first
alleged misstatement and before the suspension of trading. The District
Court allowed a presumption of reliance, therefore certifying the class.
However, it held as a matter of law that the statements made were im-
material since there was at that time no agreement in principle about
the merger. Thus, summary judgment was granted to Basic.
54
The case was appealed to the Sixth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit affirmed
the certification of the class action, but reversed and remanded the sum-
mary judgment. It held that any merger negotiations are material, and
that it believed Basic's statements were misleading. The Court also
adopted the fraud on the market theory, specifically a rebuttable pre-
sumption of reliance on the misstatements, in order to approve certifi-
cation of the class.55
The Supreme Court, on appeal, approved the use of a rebuttable pre-
sumption of reliance in order to certify the class action suit. The majority
opinion was written by Justice Blackmun for a 4-2 majority. Justices
Rehinquist, Scalia and Kennedy did not participate in the decision. Jus-
tice White wrote an important dissent, in which Justice O'Conner joined.
5 6
Blackmun began by summarizing the fraud on the market theory in
one paragraph.57 He then noted that it was not the court's province to
"assess the general validity of the theory, but to consider whether it was
proper for the courts below to apply a rebuttable presumption of reliance,
supported in part by the fraud-on-the-market theory."
58 The Court reaf-
firmed reliance as an element of the fraud/misrepresentation action under
10b-5, because it provides causation between the act and injury.59 How-
ever, it then noted that, "There is, however, more than one way to dem-
onstrate the causal connection."60 The Court cited Affiliated Ute as an
example of when positive proof of reliance was not required. The devel-
opment of an enormous impersonal market was cited as the main reason
why changes in the reliance requirement were necessary. In noting the
difference between face-to-face transactions and market transactions the
Court stated:
The market is performing a substantial part of the valuation
process performed by the investor in a face-to-face transaction.
The market is acting as the unpaid agent of the investor, in-
forming him that given all the information available to it, the
value of the stock is worth the market price.1
Id. at 229.
65 Id. at 229-30.
56 Id. at 225.
51 Basic, 485 U.S. at 241-42.
68 Id. at 242.
59 Id. at 243.
- Id.
61 Id. at 244 (quoting In re LTV Securities Litigation, 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (1980)).
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The Court then turned to a discussion of the use of presumptions in
the law, which arise "out of considerations of fairness, public policy, and
probability, as well as judicial economy. '6 2 This particular presumption
was supported by legislative policy to "facilitate an investor's reliance on
the integrity" of the market, and by the goal of increased ease of enforce-
ment of 10b-5.6 The Court also relied upon "common sense and proba-
bility" to prove that markets reflect public information and that investors
rely upon honest markets. 4
The Court continued by discussing the ways in which the presumption
could be rebutted. Generally, any evidence which "severs the link between
the alleged misrepresentation and either the price received (or paid) by
the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market price" would serve
to rebut the presumption." Specifically, the Court recognized that the
defendant could show that the elements were not shown in the case, that
a distortion in price was not caused by the misrepresentation, or that the
plaintiff would have acted even if he knew of the misrepresentation.6 6
The Court, in a footnote, identified the elements necessary for a plaintiff
to succeed as: (1) "the defendant made public misrepresentations"; (2)
"the misrepresentations were material"; (3) "the shares were traded on
an efficient market"; and (4) "the plaintiff traded the shares between the
time the misrepresentations were made and the time the truth was re-
vealed. '67 Two examples were noted as to the other defenses. First, a
defense would be successful if it could be proven that the 'market makers'
knew of the merger negotiations. Second, a defense would succeed if the
defense could prove that the plaintiff did not believe the statement that
merger negotiations were not underway, and transacted instead for an
unrelated reason.68
The dissent begins by lamenting the adoption of a theory which the
Court does not understand, and doesn't have the facilities to test. It calls
the efficient market hypothesis and its corollaries, "nothing more than
theories which may or may not prove accurate upon further considera-
tion."69 The limited resources of the Court and the radical departure from
traditional proof of a securities violation should be left to the legislature
to decide, according to the dissent.70
62 Basic, 485 U.S. at 245.
0Id. at 246.
Id. In a footnote, the Court once again refused to adopt any particular eco-
nomic theory. Id. at n.24.
6Id. at 248.
Basic, 485 U.S. at 248-49.
61 Id. at n.27.
6 Id. at 249. In footnotes again the Court refused to comment upon the speed
of the reflection of information in the market, or to comment upon the determi-
nation of damages. These were left up to the District Courts. Id. at n.n.28, 29.
6 Id. at 254.
70 Id.
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The dissent gives other substantive facts for its reasoning. First, in
looking at Congressional intent, the legislative history shows that Con-
gress considered and rejected a proposal to eliminate reliance as an ele-
ment of the securities fraud action. The dissent believed that the majority
had indeed eliminated any "meaningful" proof of reliance, because of the
difficulty of proof in rebutting the presumption.7 ' Secondly, the adoption
of the fraud-on-the-market theory conflicted with the Congressional policy
of full disclosure in the securities market. By not requiring plaintiffs to
rely upon public disclosures, the decision removed the reason for disclo-
sures. 72 Lastly, the dissent proposed that the facts of this particular case
made it "an exceedingly poor candidate for the Court's fraud-on-the-mar-
ket theory. '73 The certified class time period of fourteen months was too
long, and the fact that the plaintiffs were mostly sellers was highly un-
usual. In addition, the defendants in the case did not trade in Basic stock,
so they did not benefit from the misrepresentation. Therefore, the case
should not be covered under 10(b) since the law's prohibition is against
fraud "in connection with" the exchange of securities. 74 Lastly, the facts
of the case led to results which the dissent calls peculiar, where investors
who speculated and profited on the possibility that the company's state-
ments were false may be able to recover, since they can claim reliance
on the market. The dissent concludes by describing the decision as "a
departure in securities law that we are ill-suited to commence - and even
less equipped to control as it proceeds.
75
The use of the fraud on the market theory will proceed, despite the
dissent's warning. The following sections analyze what the future ques-
tions may be, and how parties may equip themselves with financial an-
alytical tools to address those questions.
IV. CONVERGENCE OF LEGAL AND ECONOMIC THEORY
A. Inconsistencies
The Court, at least twice, disclaimed responsibility for reviewing and
accepting the economic/financial theories it utilized.7 6 It is clear that it
did not completely incorporate those theories, since several areas of the
opinion are inconsistent with economic rationale. Primarily, the use of
defenses to rebut the presumption conflicts with the underlying premises
of the efficient market theory. Previous critics have noted that "[tihe
nonreliance and immateriality defenses reflect a misunderstanding of the
foundations of the fraud on the market theory, and an adherence to tra-
ditional assumptions of investor behavior which is no longer justified in
light of modern research into securities markets.
'
"
77
71 Basic, 485 U.S. at 258.
72 Id. at 258-59.
Id. at 259-60.
14 Id. at 261.
11 Basic, 485 U.S. at 263.
76 See supra notes 33 and 39.
7 Note, The Fraud on the Market Theory: Efficient Markets and the Defenses
to an Implied 10b-5 Action, 70 IowA L.REv. 975, 978 (1985).
1990]
13Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1990
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
The nonreliance defense is improper economically because the question
should be whether the market was affected rather than the individual.
The injury is passed through the market. The nonreliance defense can
produce inconsistent results in the determination of individual cases,
when investors were affected by the same market fluctuations.
The inconsistency between the economic and legal significance attached
to nonreliance can be traced to different interpretations of causation. The
economic viewpoint is that if the investor trades in a market that has
been misled, which therefore reflects an incorrect valuation of the secu-
rity, the investor has been injured. The legal approach encompasses that
reasoning, but requires additional proof of another type of causation.
Some courts call the first type of causation, loss causation.78 It amounts
to proof of economic loss. However, proof of economic loss only, without
the requirement of a closer nexus, could effectively create a type of strict
liability for an investor's injury. To avoid this, courts have also required
proof of transaction causation. This means that there must be a link,
more than damages, between the defendant and plaintiff. This link is the
reliance on the market. If the plaintiff exchanged securities for another
reason or would have traded anyway, then the chain of causation is bro-
ken, and the plaintiff could not recover.
The purpose of transaction causation is to limit liability to manageable
proportions. However, as the dissent in Basic complains, proof of nonre-
liance will be very difficult. 79 A statement by the plaintiff that he relied
on the integrity of the market to reflect its true value would be very
difficult, if not impossible, to disprove because of its subjectivity. A related
area that is unclear after the Court's decision is that of indirect reliance
on the market. For example, in Panzirer, the plaintiff relied on reports
in the media, which contained information about the market. Her reliance
on the market was indirect. It is easy to foresee a common occurrence of
an investor relying on the advice of a broker, which advice is erroneous
because of a false statement made by the company. Would this indirect
reliance suffice under the Basic rationale? If the Court maintains the
rationale of adapting to the changing, impersonal, securities market, then
indirect reliance on the market, through a professional, should satisfy its
requirement of reliance on the market. This is logical because it can be
assumed that the professional advisor relied on the market, and because
the individual also relied on the basic integrity of the market by allowing
his money to be invested in that market. In today's complicated and
volatile securities markets, professional advice is often sought. An inves-
tor should not be penalized for relying on a professionalW0 The result,
however, would be to further expand the category of those who could
recover under the fraud on the market theory.
78 See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Crop., 507 F. 2d 374, 380-84 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975).
79 Basic, 485 U.S. at 256 n.7.
80 See Grzebielski, supra note 16, at 347-48.
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Regarding the materiality defense, economists would argue that the
damages sustained can be measured mechanically, and therefore there
is no need to determine materiality by judicial judgment. The measure-
ment of the security's return will determine whether the statement or
omission was significant.8 '
In essence, the market will decide whether the information is material,
and one need only look to the reaction of the market to determine ma-
teriality. The legal definition of materiality differs significantly. The court
defined a fact as material if a reasonable investor would consider it sig-
nificant.82 This conclusion is based on the 'indicated probability that the
event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event.'
8 3 This legal
application conflicts with the economic hypothesis because emphasis is
given to the individual investor rather than the marketplace. The small
investor, according to economic theory, has little or no effect on the mar-
ket. Instead, the market is controlled by professionals, thereby making
the market efficient because of their access to and superior assimilation
of information. Extrapolating from this, the investor who is reasonable
would not make an individual determination of materiality, but would
rely on the market to do so instead84 Thus, a defense of non-materiality
could be determined mathematically and should not be dependent upon
the individual investor. This element of the economic hypothesis of mar-
ket efficiency conflicts squarely with the legal and congressional emphasis
on the protection of the individual investor, and the promotion of indi-
vidual access to truthful information.
Despite the Court's decision of materiality, it recognized a defense to
the presumption that the price in the market was not distorted by the
misrepresentation. This seems to give effect to the economic view that
materiality will be reflected in the market. Likewise, the example given
by the Court that knowledge of the 'market makers' would prevent dis-
tortion of price and thus be a defense is inconsistent with implementation
of the reasonable investor approach to materiality. The Court relates
these defenses to the requirement that injury be caused by reliance on
the market.85 If the market was not fooled, then the investor would not
be injured. This, however, conflicts with the analysis of materiality, which
is based upon the reasonable investor standard. Since reliance is on the
market, materiality should be determined by the reaction of the market,
instead of the determination of the reasonable investor's belief, when a
presumption of reliance on the integrity of the market is invoked. Thus,
the inconsistencies between proving materiality and rebutting the pre-
sumption would be eliminated.
81 See Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases In-
volving Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. LAW. 1, 5-7 (1982); Note, The Measure
of Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 26
STAN.L.REv. 371, 386-90 (1974).
12 Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, at 231-32.
RId. at 238.
8 See Fischel, supra note 81, at 3-5.85 Basic, 485 U.S. at 248.
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The rebuttable presumption of reliance on an efficient market is based
upon "common sense and probability" as well as economic theory. Since
the Supreme Court sidestepped important issues, they must be faced on
a case by case basis by the District Courts,86 who will be required to define
the interplay between common sense and economic analysis.
V. IDENTIFYING LEGAL USES OF FINANCIAL ANALYSIS
Financial analysis will be important for courts to consider when at-
tempting to answer some of the important questions left open by Basic.
However, even with the use of data and studies, uncertainty will remain
in some areas. This section identifies the extent of usefulness of economic
analysis in fraud on the market cases, and illustrates that use with an
empirical study of the Basic case.
First, the Court supplies no legal definition of an efficient or inefficient
market, but only seems to operate on a sense of probability. It may be
that a plaintiff should merely request a court to take judicial notice of
the fact that a market is efficient. 7 On the other hand, courts may decide
to consider empirical data of efficiency offered by financial experts." The
courts will find however, that the financial information they seek is gen-
erally unavailable. The question of an efficient market is critical where
small markets or new issues are involved. Shores I and Raney represent
examples of such cases. Economists have limited their studies for the
most part, however, to the New York Stock Exchange. Relevant data for
other markets may be unavailable or incomplete. Courts may decide that
any market for which data is unavailable cannot be determined to be
efficient, or they may rely on their own common sense or probability to
determine the issue.89 A District Court is in less of a position to make
Other gaps are left for trial courts to fill in based upon economic theory. For
example, the Court specifically declined to address the issue of damages. Id. at
248 n. 28. Certainly, in future cases, it will be argued that damages should be
assessed according to the mechanical formulation espoused by economists. The
defense of an inefficient market, or the timing of the market's response to infor-
mation are critical questions which the Court, in a footnote, leaves to the trier
of fact. Id. at 249 n. 29. These are questions whose answers (if there are definite
ones) may lie in empirical research and academic postulation, which may be less
than definitive.
17 See, Note, Rule 10b-5 Securities Fraud: Regulating the Application of the
Fraud-on-the-Market Theory of Liability, 18 J. MARSHALL L.REv. 733, 747-48(1985) (efficiency should be a question of law, listing applicable factors).
8 Since Basic, the question of defining an efficient market has been addressed,
but unanswered, as the cases have been concerned with procedure, so far. See
Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989) (pretrial evidentiary hearing
on efficiency of market unnecessary); Garfinkel v. Memory Metals, Inc., 695 F.
Supp. 1397 (D.Conn. 1988) (efficient market determination goes to merit of case);
Tolan v. Computervision Corp., 696 F. Supp. 771 (D.Mass. 1988) (efficient market
presumption is not to be rebutted before trial).
Capitalization of listed firms, the frequency of cross-listing, the volume of
trading and the extent of institutional interest in the listed issues should be
factors in assessing the efficiency of smaller, regional exchanges.
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these complex judgments than the Supreme Court of the United States.
As the dissent argued, perhaps the Court should have left these deter-
minations to the legislature.
According to the standards set out by Basic, defenses to the fraud on
the market theory include that the market did not react to the misre-
presentation, for example, or that the market makers did not believe the
misleading information. It will be difficult to summon up some particular
individuals, who can be identified as 'market makers,' and who will con-
fess to knowledge of the truth. The effect of a misrepresentation, an event,
however, can be analyzed using data about the movement of the market
around that date.
Empirical financial analysis will provide significant evidence to show
whether the market responded to the incorrect information. An investor
can show that some activity by management resulted in an economic loss
for shareholders by demonstrating that the stock traded at a price below
what it normally would have traded. Conversely, if there is no significant
difference, then a defendant has a basis for arguing that the market
makers did not believe the information, for whatever reason, that the
market did not react to the information, and there was no distortion in
price. Thus, the defendant could successfully rebut the fraud on the mar-
ket presumption, and the plaintiff would be required to prove individual
reliance on a misstatement. That analysis is described below, and the
Basic facts are used as an example of how the empirical analysis would
be usedY0
In order for an investor to show that some activity by management
resulted in an economic loss for shareholders, he must demonstrate that
the stock traded at a price below what it normally would have traded.
The difference in value represents the per-share loss, expressed as:
LOSS - P,- P
where P, = normal trading price
P. = actual trading price
Existing research methodologies that analyze share performance and
equity behavior use rates of return rather than share prices.
91 This allows
inter-firm or firm and industry comparisons to be more meaningful, since
a rate of return standardizes changes in the stock price. This allows for
a comparison of a $10 change for a $100 priced stock, with a $6 change
for a stock valued at $25.
Use of empirical event study is suggested by Fischel, supra note 81. See also
Beck-Dudley, The Efficient Market Theory and Insider Trading: Are We Headed
in the Right Direction? 27 AM. Bus. L.J. 441, 459-61 (1989) (applies event meth-
odology to insider trading).
9' For instance, all of the asset valuation models are stated in terms of equi-
librium rates of return rather than share price level. See Sharpe, Capital Asset
Prices: A Theory Of Market Equilibrium Under Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425 (1964); Black
& Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 71 J. POL. ECON. 637(1973).
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The rate of return on a stock, ignoring any dividends, is simply the
percentage change in price. That is:
Pnew - Pold
Pold
where ROR - rate of return
P = new stock price
Pold - old stock price
For instance, if a stock was selling at $89.50 per share and then the
stock price declined to $73.75, the ROR would be -17.6%. Obviously one
can calculate ROR's over a week, a month, a quarter or any other specified
time period. In order to examine the impact of a solitary event on share-
holder wealth and thereby estimate the magnitude of an economic loss,
researchers generally examine daily rates of return.92
More specifically, one studies the pattern of daily stock rates of return
over a period surrounding the event of interest. This allows one to de-
termine if there is evidence of information leakage prior to the event or
a lingering effect in the post-event period. Generally, the impact on share-
holder wealth is focused on the actual event day itself. This is because
financial markets are quick to respond to events that contain information
relevant to a firm's future financial performance.9 3
The actual daily rates of return calculated with this methodology are
adjusted for the expected rate of return. After netting out the expected
component of return, only the residual component remains. The esti-
mation of daily expected rates of return for a stock is accomplished
through use of an empirical model called the Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM). 94 Extensively tested and applied, 95 the CAPM postulates a stock's
expected return as follows:
92 The use of daily rates of return in examining the impact of information-
laden events on shareholder wealth is well established. See J. MARTIN, S. Cox &
R. MACMINN, THE THEORY OF FINANCE: EVIDENCE AND APPLICATIONS 263-285(1988) (a review of major studies using this approach).
Among the many studies that could be cited where this is true, see Fama,
supra note 12.
" For a discussion of the origins and development of the CAPM, see Sharpe,
Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk,
19 J. FIN. 425 (1964); Lintner, The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of
Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets 41 REV. ECON. STATIS-
Tics 13 (1965); Mossin, Equilibrium in a Capital Asset Pricing Market, 34 ECON-
OMETRICA 168 (1966).
Il See Fama, Risk, Return, and Equilibrium, 69 J. POL. ECON. 30 (1971); Fama
& MacBeth, Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests, 71 J. POL. ECON.
607 (1973); Roll, Critique of the Asset Pricing Theory's Test, 75 J. FIN. ECON. 129
(1977).
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EXPECT = RISKFREE + BETA x (MARKET - RISK-
FREE)
where EXPECT = expected daily rate of return for the stock
RISKFREE = return on the riskless asset
(e.g. U.S. Government bond)
BETA = an index of the stock's sensitivity to the aggregate
market for stocks
MARKET = expected return on the market portfolio for that
day; often proxied by the S&P 500 Index
Thus for each stock, we can estimate an expected return for the day.
It is this expected component of return that incorporates the impact of
marketwide or macroeconomic factors (e.g., Gross National Product, un-
employment, interest rates). We then subtract this expected component
from the actual return to obtain a residual component of return:
RES = ROR - EXPECT
where RES = residual rate of return
ROR = actual or realized daily rate of return
We perform this calculation of the residual rate of return in order to
control for those factors that systematically influence the level of stock
returns and could thereby distort our estimate of the rate of return at-
tributable to firm specific performance. Thus, if one observes a negative
residual rate of return for a stock upon the announcement of some event,
it can be attributed to that event rather than a generally depressed stock
market. This approach is extremely robust and has been used to examine
the impact of events as diverse as quarterly earnings announcements,
the release of the monthly Consumer Price Index and the resignation of
corporate CEO's.
A number of different issues and concerns arise in the application of
the event methodology. Though chiefly focusing on the statistical and
estimation procedures, they nevertheless impact the interpretation of the
final empirical results.96 The following discussion will review some of the
more important choices and topics associated with this methodology.
In order to calculate a residual rate of return we net an expected return
from the actual or realized rate of return. There are alternative ap-
proaches to calculating the expected return. The most common method
is the risk and market adjusted approach that is used in this study. Other
96 For an excellent introductory discussion of the interpretation of statistical
levels of significance and use of the t-statistic, see J. VAN MATRE & G. GILBREATH,
STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 301-14 (3d ed. 1987). Numerous event
studies employ the t-statistic to infer significance. See DeAngelo and Rice, Anti-
takeover Charter Amendments and Stockholder Wealth, Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics, 12 J. FIN. ECON. 329 (1983); Mikkelson & Ruback, An Empirical Analysis
of the Interfirm Equity Investment Process, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 523 (1985).
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methods use either a simple historical average of the stock's past returns
or the mean market return, without adjusting for the security's specific
risk. Depending upon the specific circumstances of the case, these alter-
native methods may perform better or provide greater computational
facility relative to the risk and market adjusted method.91
Another issue that plagues users of this approach is missing data. Data
over the relevant periods may be missing due to unavailability or non-
trading. Several choices face the investigator. Each of the approaches
have their merits and no method appears dominant for every instance 8
If the event methodology approach is applied to a group of firms, as is
usually done, then there is the possibility of events clustering in calendar
time. This is especially true for investigators examining the impact of
government regulations, tax law changes or modifications on accounting
methods. Such clustering increases the variance of abnormal returns and
consequently reduces the ability of standard statistical tests to detect
abnormal performance." Thus, if several misrepresentations were made
around the same date, this approach may be unhelpful.
The last issue that we would like to examine in using the event method
approach is the measurement of the market return. Finance theory and
the asset valuation literature suggests that use of a dollar-valued
weighted market index. That is, the equities in the market portfolio are
weighted by the dollar value of their shares outstanding. In such a port-
folio, larger capitalized firms will be more fully represented. An equally-
weighted index, however, with all firms receiving the same emphasis is
more likely to detect abnormal performance, and is the index that should
be used, for the most part.
Although the event method approach is a widely employed technique
and presents highly technical and quantitative results, it is not without
judgment on part of the investigator. Understanding the researcher's
options and potential for bias in the results will permit a better inter-
pretation of the findings from this method. Event methodology should be
used and is reliable, but the legal players should be aware of the possible
variations in order to ensure standard application of the analysis.
Let us now apply this approach, event methodology, to Basic, Inc. On
October 21, 1977, Basic issued a public statement denying they were in
the process of merger negotiations. Furthermore, they disclaimed know-
ledge of any information that might account for the recent heavy trading
in Basic's stock.
17 For an overview of the issues and choices involved in the application of the
event methodology, see Peterson, Event Studies: A Review of Issues and Meth-
odology, 28 Q.J. Bus. & EcoN. 36, (1989).
For an analysis of the relative effectiveness of these methods under a number
of different scenarios, see Brown & Warner, Measuring Security Price Perform-
ance, 8 J. FIN. ECON. 205 (1980); Brown and Warner, Using Daily Stock Returns:
The Case of Event Studies, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1985).
" For a discussion of the possible uses and biases in alternative methods for
handling missing data, see Eades, Hess, & Kim, Market Rationality and Dividend
Announcements, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 581 (1985).
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The actual statistical results are presented in Table 1. In the period
preceding Basic's public announcement we see that the residual rates of
return are without statistical significance. That is, the variation in these
rates of return are viewed as random fluctuations, driven by chance rather
than economic factors. On the day of the announcement, however, we
note a residual return of -0.60% to Basic's equity. Estimation of the widely
used statistic indicates that the likelihood of obtaining this sized residual
purely by chance is less than 1%.100 For the ten days following this an-
nouncement, the residual rates of return again vary without statistical
significance. Thus, the empirical evidence from the event methodology
approach clearly attributes the unusually large negative residual return
to the actions of management on that day.
TABLE 1
RESIDUAL STOCK RETURNS FOR BASIC, INC. OVER THE
PERIOD SURROUNDING THE FRAUDULENT ANNOUNCEMENT
OF OCTOBER 21, 1977
DAILY PERCENTAGE
DAY RESIDUAL RATE OF RETURN t STATISTIC
10 OCT 1977 0.013 0.618
11 OCT 1977 -0.007 -0.364
12 OCT 1977 0.004 0.019
13 OCT 1977 0.009 0.396
14 OCT 1977 0.024 1.554
17 OCT 1977 -0.013 -0.295
18 OCT 1977 0.044 1.148
19 OCT 1977 0.038 1.021
20 OCT 1977 0.022 1.067
21 OCT 1977 -0.060 -2.892*
24 OCT 1977 0.005 0.363
25 OCT 1977 0.037 0.357
26 OCT 1977 0.024 0.891
27 OCT 1977 0.017 0.962
28 OCT 1977 -0.008 -1.043
31 OCT 1977 0.002 0.786
1 NOV 1977 0.016 1.084
2 NOV 1977 0.016 1.084
3 NOV 1977 0.044 1.240
*Indicates statistical significance at the 1% level
100 See C. HUANG & R. LITZENBERGER, FOUNDATIONS FOR FINANCIAL ECONOMICS;
J. MARTIN, S. Cox & R. MACMINN, supra note 92.
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Given that Basic, Inc.'s stock closed at $20 per share on the preceding
trading day, we calculate the following dollar loss per share:
LOSS = (CLOSING PRICE) x (RESIDUAL RETURN)
= ($20) x (0.006)
= $0.12
With 1,347,000 shares outstanding, the total economic loss suffered by
shareholders was $161,640.
On 6 November 1978 Basic's management again released fraudulent
statements regarding possible merger negotiations. The results from an
event study around this date are presented in Table 2. There are no
statistically significant residual returns. The residual return observed on
6 November 1978 is a chance variation, due to random stock price move-
ments. This failure to observe a response, however, is not difficult to
interpret. Stock prices are moved by new information. By this time in
1978, speculation, information leakage and investor analysis had elim-
inated any news content of managerial press releases. Indeed, the market
had determined that the announcements were incorrect and consequently
failed to move Basic's stock price in any significant manner.
TABLE 2
RESIDUAL STOCK RETURNS FOR BASIC, INC. OVER THE
PERIOD SURROUNDING THE FRAUDULENT ANNOUNCEMENT
OF 6 NOVEMBER 1978
DAILY PERCENTAGE
DAY RESIDUAL RATE OF RETURN t STATISTIC
24 OCT 1978 
-0.015 
-0.645
25 OCT 1978 0.022 0.434
26 OCT 1978 
-0.026 
-1.317
27 OCT 1978 0.036 1.524
30 OCT 1978 0.007 1.099
31 OCT 1978 0.005 0.212
1 NOV 1978 0.009 0.263
2 NOV 1978 -0.031 
-1.096
3 NOV 1978 0.010 0.765
6 NOV 1978 0.024 0.441
7 NOV 1978 
-0.027 
-0.901
8 NOV 1978 0.013 0.274
9 NOV 1978 0.016 1.443
10 NOV 1978 0.024 0.156
13 NOV 1978 0.031 0.692
14 NOV 1978 0.017 1.013
15 NOV 1978 0.027 1.476
16 NOV 1978 0.006 0.288
17 NOV 1978 
-0.029 0.196
20 NOV 1978 
-0.033 0.763
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USE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
The implications for this empirical analysis are significant. It shows
the market did react to the first press release by Basic. However, because
there was no market reaction caused by the second statement, the reliance
on the market to reflect the true value was not compromised. The result
should be the shortening of the class period. All those who traded after
the second statement should be required to provide actual reliance on the
misstatement.
VI. CONCLUSION
The extent to which economic theories and empirical analysis of the
efficient capital market are incorporated within securities law is uncer-
tain. The Supreme Court avoided wholesale adoption of economic theory.
Nonetheless, the Court recognized the changing nature of securities
transactions, from face to face sales to trades in an impersonal market
where buyer and seller never meet. In order to adapt the laws to this
developing environment, the Court recognized that reliance can be in-
direct, by reliance on the market, thus expanding Affiliated Ute. The
Court thus chose to at least recognize the economic concept of an efficient
market. A strong argument can be made that empirical analysis will now
be essential to a securities fraud case when the presumption of reliance
on the market is invoked. It provides the clearest evidence of the market's
response to particular information, which may provide a defense to the
presumption of reliance. Empirical studies do not, however, offer a bright
line test for market efficiency. This is a question the courts must set
standards for in the future, as a new era of 10(b)(5) litigation ensues.
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